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Courts have long said that legal claims are a constitutionally protected
form of property. But what does that mean? This essay explores the
treatment of legal claims as property rights in the context of mass torts
in doctrinal, theoretical, and economic terms. Corrective justice and
civil recourse conceptions of tort law dictate that tort claims are owned
by individual plaintiffs. Allocating these property rights at the
individual scale can make it difficult to use public mechanisms, like
class actions, to aggregate mass tort plaintiffs’ claims to achieve tort
law’s instrumental goals like deterrence horizontal equity. At the same
time property rights in tort claims facilitate aggregation and mass
settlement through private ordering that often sweeps away
individualized distinctions among plaintiffs. While the private aggregate
settlements that emerge may sometimes further tort law’s instrumental
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goals, they do so fortuitously, as a byproduct of intermediaries seeking
private gain from bundling claims together for sale to the defendant en
masse, and without the transparency or oversight of public alternatives.
INTRODUCTION
Legal claims are property rights. To say so is doctrinally uncon-
troversial. Indeed, the Supreme Court has so held numerous times.1 A
chose in action is a constitutionally protected form of property. This is
true before the legal claim is liquidated into a judgment and, indeed,
before the claim is even filed with a court.2
The idea that tort claims are a form of property rights is rooted in a
corrective justice or civil recourse conception of tort law. When you
are injured, you have a claim against the tortfeasor; it does not belong
to someone else or to the state. In mass torts, however—the context
with which I am primarily concerned in this Essay—the allocation of
these property rights at the individual level creates a mismatch of
scale. Mass tort defendants operate—and litigate—at a mass level.
And the individual allocation of property rights in tort claims can frus-
trate efforts to achieve some of tort law’s more instrumental goals
through formal public mechanisms for treating claims in the aggre-
gate. It is hard to use mechanisms like class actions and statistical ad-
judication to achieve goals like deterrence and horizontal equity when
each claimant owns an individual claim that she may control as she
sees fit.
At the same time, and perhaps ironically, treating individual tort
claims as a form of property facilitates the aggregation and settlement
of claims through private ordering. Lawyers and other intermediaries
specialize in bundling these claims together and negotiating their sale
to the defendant en masse. And the private aggregate settlements that
emerge often result in the same kinds of averaging and approximation
that corrective justice and civil recourse theories reject in public
models.
1. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof’l Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (“Little doubt re-
mains that [a cause of action] is property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); Gibbes v. Zim-
merman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882).
2. See, e.g., Pritchard, 106 U.S. at 132; see also Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Legal Claims as Private
Property: Implications for Eminent Domain, 36 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 373, 377–78 (2009);
Thomas Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 913 (2000);
Olivia A. Radin, Note, Rights as Property, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1331 (2004); Ryan C.
Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs and the Right Not to Sue, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 599,
619–21 (2015).
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These private methods of aggregation and resolution—made possi-
ble precisely because tort claims are property—may have the fortui-
tous result of furthering some of tort law’s instrumental goals. They
may increase deterrence by enabling injured plaintiffs to more effi-
ciently bring claims and increase horizontal equity by smoothing out
some of tort law’s individualistic features. But because these methods
are designed by private claims brokers and operate in the dark
shadows of the law, they lack the transparency of more public alterna-
tives and may create opportunities for rent seeking by their repeat-
player denizens.
I. TORT CLAIMS ARE PROPERTY
To call legal claims property rights is more than just semantics. Call-
ing something property has legal consequences. It triggers constitu-
tional protections under the Due Process and Takings Clauses.3 And it
has economic consequences. It implies that there are certain things
that you can do with your rights (e.g., control them, use them, alienate
them). It also implies that they are your rights, and thus there are
limits on what other people can do with them.
But, as Thomas Grey told us four decades ago, our conception of
property rights has disintegrated substantially from Blackstone’s “sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe.”4 So what is it that we mean when we say
that tort claims are property?
The property right in a tort claim cannot be simply an entitlement
to compensation from the defendant. If you possess a legal claim—
even a meritorious one—you do not get compensation automatically;
you have to litigate it to judgment, a process that may require you to
spend a substantial amount of money and effort. And, of course, you
might lose. But you still have a property interest in an unliquidated
claim, even one that may turn out to be non-meritorious and result in
no compensation. Preclusion law, class action law, and even bank-
ruptcy law all protect rights in unliquidated legal claims.5 The value of
the property right may depend on the strength of the underlying
claim, but its existence does not.
3. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
4. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 NOMOS 69, 73 (1980) (quoting 2 SIR
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (11th ed. 1791)).
5. See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (preclusion); Shutts, 472 U.S. at 808
(class actions); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012); Parker v. Goodman, 499 F.3d 616, 624–25 (6th Cir.
2007) (bankruptcy).
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A. Bundle of Procedural Rights
Using the familiar bundle of rights metaphor,6 we might think of the
property interest in a tort claim as a bundle of procedural rights. This
focus on procedural rights is in line with a civil recourse theory of tort
law, where tortious conduct by the defendant entitles the plaintiff to
seek redress in the courts.7 Within the bundle, the contours of some
essential rights are shaped by the constitutional law of due process
(e.g., the right to be heard and the right to a neutral decision maker).
Other rights may be dictated by the rules of civil procedure, evidence,
or legal ethics applicable in the particular court system invoked by the
plaintiff. And some are, of course, defined by reference to the under-
lying substantive tort law applicable to the parties’ dispute. It is possi-
ble that some of these procedural rights may not be at the core of a
chose in action and could be limited or stripped away without infring-
ing on the plaintiff’s property interest, but let’s leave that question for
another day.8
The bundle of rights in a tort claim includes, at a minimum, the
right to control how the claim is used, the right to exclude others from
using the claim, and at least some right to alienate the claim.
The owner of a tort claim gets to decide how to use the claim. She
may sue and invoke the judicial process to seek recourse for her in-
jury. But she also has the right not to sue, for any reason or no
reason.9
The bundle also includes the right to exclude. The doctrines of
standing and claim preclusion exclude other people from using the
owner’s claim.10 If strangers were to try to litigate on her behalf, the
claim owner would not be bound.11 Similarly, legal ethics rules ex-
6. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 363–66 (2001).
7. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917 (2010).
8. In the Trans Union Privacy Litigation class action settlement, for example, the parties set-
tled only the right to litigate claims on a class action or aggregate basis, leaving intact the rights
of each plaintiff to litigate his or her substantive Fair Credit Reporting Act claim on an individ-
ual basis. In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2014). If the right to
aggregate is part of the core property interest in the claim, then a transaction like the Trans
Union settlement might face a due process challenge. For a discussion of this form of unbundling
of procedural rights in a legal claims, see D. Theodore Rave, When Peace Is Not the Goal of a
Class Action Settlement, 50 GA. L. REV. 475, 508 (2016).
9. Williams, supra note 2, at 622–23.
10. See id. at 624.
11. Subject only to narrowly drawn exceptions not relevant here. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553
U.S. 880, 892 (2008).
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clude even the lawyer for the claim owner from making certain funda-
mental decisions about how the claim is to be used.12
The owner also has at least some rights to alienate a tort claim.
Although traditionally most tort claims have been considered per-
sonal to the plaintiff and thus not freely assignable like some other
legal claims,13 there are several ways in which tort claims are aliena-
ble. Most fundamentally, the plaintiff can sell the claim to the defen-
dant in a settlement (either before or after initiating a lawsuit).14 A
plaintiff can also transfer the claim to an insurer through subroga-
tion.15 The plaintiff can assign at least a partial ownership stake in the
claim to a lawyer through a contingency fee arrangement.16 And
newer models of litigation finance that involve assigning equity stakes
in the claim to third parties are gaining traction.17
12. A lawyer cannot settle a claim without the client’s consent. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 283 (2011). Nor can a lawyer who represents
multiple clients enter an aggregate settlement of their claims without the informed consent of
each client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
13. See, e.g., 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assignments §§ 46, 48, 55 (2013). A robust secondary market for
some legal claims, like debt claims, has emerged in many states. Other states limit the sale of
many forms of legal claims (e.g., fraud, personal injury) to third parties. See Anthony J. Sebok,
The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 75–82 (2011) [hereinafter Sebok, Inauthentic].
Sebok suggests that, traditionally and even under modern doctrine in some states, personal in-
jury claims are not a form of property that can be “owned” because they are not assignable.
Anthony J. Sebok, Jeffrey O’Connell and the Market for Tort Claims, 6 J. TORT L. 115, 133
(2013) (“Although it sounds odd to say, not even the original victim in a personal tort ‘owns’ her
cause of action, which is not to say that she does not possess control over it. The cause of action
in a personal tort simply cannot be owned by anyone; and that is why it cannot be assigned.”).
But, as Sebok acknowledges, this reluctance to allow assignment of personal injury claims is
based on a formalistic anachronism that such claims are inchoate. Id. And just because some
most states will not recognize the assignment of a personal injury claim does mean that such a
claim is not a form of property that can be owned and afforded constitutional protections—or
indeed that it cannot be alienated in other ways, as discussed in the text.
14. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 419
(2001).
15. See Nathaniel Donahue & John Fabian Witt, Tort as Private Administration, 105 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3349858; see
also Sebok, Inauthentic, supra note 13, at 83–84. R
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 (2000).
17. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1301 (2012); Samuel Issacharoff, Litigation Funding and the Problem of
Agency Cost in Representative Actions, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 561 (2014); Maya Steinitz, Whose
Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1277–78 (2011).
Even with the emergence of third-party investors, however, the market for tort claims is necessa-
rily thin, as there is only one ultimate buyer—the defendant. The defendant is a monopsonist.
Contingency fee lawyers, subrogees, and third-party financiers are simply middlemen. Though
that is not to say that the middlemen cannot add value by brokering the transaction and aggre-
gating and packaging plaintiffs’ claims in ways that can extract more value from the defendant.
For more elaboration, see Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, It’s Good to Have the
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B. Put Options
Another way in which we might think about tort claims as property
is in economic terms. Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed fa-
mously drew a distinction between entitlements protected by property
rules and those protected by liability rules.18 A property rule makes
the entitlement holder the sole decider on how the entitlement will be
allocated—she can veto any involuntary transfer of the entitlement.19
A liability rule, by contrast, allows another party to take the entitle-
ment and then pay the original owner a court-determined amount of
damages.20 Under this framework, tort law is the quintessential liabil-
ity rule. A product manufacturer, for example, may take a consumer’s
entitlement to be free from injury, so long as the manufacturer pays
for the damage it causes.
Ian Ayres extended this analysis by explaining that a liability rule
gives at least one party an “option” to force the transfer of an entitle-
ment at a court-determined exercise price.21 This option could take
the form of either a “call” or a “put.” A call option is a right to buy an
asset at a set exercise price within a set period of time. Conversely, a
put option is the right to sell (that is, to force someone else to buy) an
asset at a set price within a set period of time. Ayres’ great insight was
that we can decouple who owns the initial entitlement from who gets
to decide whether it is transferred.22 Thus our product manufacturer
has a call option to take the consumer’s entitlement to remain injury-
free for the exercise price of damages determined by the court.
Of course, when the product manufacturer exercises that option,
the victim does not just magically get damages. Calabresi, Melamed,
and Ayres were all analyzing the ex ante world of incentives. In the ex
post world, instead of damages, the victim gets a new kind of entitle-
ment: a tort claim—that bundle of procedural rights that allow the
new plaintiff to use the court system to attempt to extract damages
from the defendant, and which the Supreme Court has recognized as a
constitutionally protected form of property.23
In economic terms, then, we might think of a tort claim as a put
option. The plaintiff has the option to force the defendant to buy the
“Haves” on Your Side: A Defense of Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation, 108 GEO. L.J. 73,
89–92 (2019) [hereinafter Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side].
18. Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 5 (2005).
22. Id. at 7.
23. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985).
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claim for a price determined by the court within the statute of limita-
tions period. Of course, exercising that option is not costless. It may
cost the plaintiff a substantial amount of money to litigate all the way
to the point where the court sets the exercise price (i.e., determines
damages) and forces the defendant to make the purchase. These liti-
gation costs are part of the “premium” that the plaintiff pays for the
put option.24 Exercising the option also imposes litigation costs on the
defendant. For this reason, and because of the inherent uncertainty of
predicting litigation outcomes, the plaintiff’s option has economic
value independent of the strength of the underlying claim.25 Accord-
ingly, it will very often be in both parties’ interest for the defendant to
purchase the plaintiff’s claim at an agreed upon price (i.e., to settle)
before the plaintiff exercises her put option.
These litigation options do not, of course, work exactly like options
in the financial markets (for example, much of the “premium” to ac-
quire and use the option is paid to third parties like lawyers, not to the
option-writing counterparty).26 But the important point is not how
tight the analogy is. The important point is that the plaintiff is the
decider. The plaintiff decides whether to file a lawsuit before the stat-
ute of limitations runs and the option thus expires. Having done so,
the plaintiff decides whether to press on to trial, to accept a settlement
offer, or to drop the claim altogether. Ultimately, with enough perse-
verance (and financial outlay) the plaintiff can force the defendant to
purchase her claim at the court-determined price (though that price
may, at the end of the day, turn out to be less than the plaintiff’s costs,
or even $0). The defendant, by contrast, cannot typically force an un-
24. Cf. Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real
Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1288–89 (2006) (“Legal fees and other costs consti-
tute premiums that a plaintiff must pay to third parties, such as lawyers and experts, and not to
the defendant, in order to optimize the lawsuit’s value.”).
25. Options theory predicts that the value of an option goes up as variability and uncertainty
about valuation of the underlying asset increases. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at
1287–88; see also Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 173 (1990). Grundfest and Huang analyze plaintiffs’ claims as call options, not put
options. In their model, the plaintiff holds a call option to either abandon the suit or invest a set
amount of money in the litigation to purchase new information (through discovery or obtaining
a ruling on a motion or the like) about how much damages the court is likely to award while
simultaneously imposing costs on the defendant. Grundfest and Huang suggest that plaintiffs will
pursue even negative expected value suits for their option value if the range of potential ex-
pected values is high enough and the price of obtaining new information low enough. But see
Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 212–22 (2007)
(critiquing Grundfest and Huang’s options model). Although I am adopting a different frame-
work here, this analysis of claims as call options reinforces my point that it is the plaintiff who
decides what to do with the claim—to press on or abandon it.
26. See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 24, at 1288–89.
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willing plaintiff to sell her claim.27 The plaintiff retains the right to
reject even a generous settlement offer as well as the right not to sue
at all.28 The plaintiff holds the option. The plaintiff gets to decide.
It did not have to be this way. Our system could have made some-
one else the decider. We could have given the defendant a call option
to buy claims from unwilling plaintiffs. That is essentially what hap-
pens in bankruptcy and interpleader. But outside of the contexts of
insolvency or competing claims on a limited fund, we generally do not
give the defendant a call option. Indeed, even when a defendant
makes an offer of judgment for more than the plaintiff is seeking in
damages, courts have shied away from treating the plaintiff’s claim as
moot if the offer is unaccepted.29 We could have made the govern-
ment the decider, as in qui tam suits where the government can inter-
vene, seize control from the relator, and decide whether to press,
settle, or dismiss the claim. But aside from a handful of statutes like
the False Claims Act, the qui tam model is rare.30 Or we could have a
more overtly regulatory system where injured parties complain to the
state, and a state agency decides whether to commence (or cease) a
public enforcement action, which, if successful might be accompanied
with some form of restitution for the complainant. But we have opted
to leave large swaths of public policy—including tort law—to private
enforcement.
By allocating tort claims to private plaintiffs, we have made individ-
ual plaintiffs the deciders. Each plaintiff gets to decide how to use the
bundle of procedural rights that make up the claim. The plaintiff has
the option to sue or not sue, to settle or not to settle. And because
those legal claims are property rights, due process and other doctrines
protect the individual plaintiff’s role as the decider on what happens
to those claims.31
27. There are exceptions to this general rule. One other insight from option theory is that
where there are puts there can also be calls. See AYRES, supra note 21, at 6. And so it is with
legal claims. Under certain circumstances, a defendant may have a mirroring call option to force
the plaintiff to sell the claim at a court-determined price through either interpleader or
bankruptcy.
28. See Williams, supra note 2, at 622–23.
29. Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 674 (2016); see also Diane Myers, Com-
ment, Mooting the Fair Labor Standards Act: How Offers of Judgment Are Eliminating the FLSA
Collective Action, 53 HOUSTON L. REV. 303, 331–32 (2015).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). See generally David Y. Kwok, Evidence From the False Claims
Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 228–30
(2013).
31. See Williams, supra note 2.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL207.txt unknown Seq: 9 21-APR-20 12:08
2020] TORT CLAIMS AS PROPERTY RIGHTS 595
II. PROPERTY RIGHTS ARE ALLOCATED AT THE WRONG SCALE
IN MASS TORTS
Allocating property rights in tort claims to individual plaintiffs
makes sense under a corrective justice view of tort law. After all, if the
defendant has harmed a plaintiff, it is that plaintiff whom the defen-
dant must make whole, not some hypothetical construct of an average
plaintiff or the public more generally.32 The logic is even more com-
pelling under a civil recourse theory. When a plaintiff is wronged, civil
recourse theory says that plaintiff is empowered to use the court sys-
tem to seek redress from the defendant.33 The property nature of tort
claims is practically baked into civil recourse theory.
But, at least when we are talking about mass torts, those property
rights may be allocated at the wrong scale to achieve some of the
more instrumental goals of tort law, like deterrence and horizontal
equity. And the individual allocation of property rights in tort claims
may also frustrate individual plaintiffs’ attempts to maximize the value
of those claims.34
A. Frustrating Tort Law’s Instrumental Goals
In mass torts, defendants operate at a mass scale. Property rights in
tort claims, however, are allocated at an individual scale. This mis-
match in scale can create problems of under-deterrence and a lack of
horizontal equity.35
For tort law to achieve optimal deterrence, the defendant must in-
ternalize the costs of the harms that it causes. But internalization de-
pends on enforcement, and enforcement is not costless. Much of this is
familiar ground.36 The cost of litigation may make it practically impos-
sible for some plaintiffs to pursue their claims on an individual basis.37
And even when they can, the defendant has built-in advantages in
terms of scale economies and repeat-play.38 The repeat-player defen-
32. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,
701 (2003).
33. Id. at 699.
34. See D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L.
REV. 1183, 1185 (2013) [hereinafter Rave, Anticommons].
35. See Sergio Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1085–87 (2012).
36. For one classic treatment, see David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Indi-
vidual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 573 (1987).
37. A science-heavy drug defect case, for example, can cost upwards of $250,000 to litigate to
judgment. See Lynn A. Baker, Mass Torts and the Pursuit of Ethical Finality, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1943, 1952 (2017).
38. See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions: The Only Option for Mass
Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847–53 (2002) [hereinafter Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation
Class Actions]; Campos, supra note 35, at 1076.
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dant can play the odds and play for rules, to borrow Marc Galanter’s
terms, and thus tilt the playing field in its favor.39
Unless the plaintiffs can aggregate their claims, underenforcement
is nearly inevitable. And the allocation of property rights in the plain-
tiffs’ claims at the individual level means that the plaintiffs will have to
incur the transaction costs of any attempts at aggregation.40 Even if
plaintiffs do succeed in aggregating their claims—likely because some
lawyer was willing to invest in bundling claims together—the alloca-
tion of property rights in claims at the individual level makes it diffi-
cult for the repeat players who emerge on the plaintiffs’ side to play as
effectively as the defendant. The individual plaintiffs own the claims,
not the lawyer. Thus the repeat-player plaintiff’s lawyer is not allowed
to play the odds or play for rules like the defendant by making trade-
offs across her inventory of claims.41 And, as a result, the defendant is
unlikely to internalize all of the costs of its conduct and will be left
under-deterred.42
On the flip side, once aggregation occurs, claims that are weaker on
the merits may flow into the system. One frequent complaint about
federal multidistrict litigation (MDL) is that it creates a “Field of
Dreams” problem: “If you build it, they will come.”43 Defendants
often complain that once an MDL is launched, it is flooded with tag-
along claims that lack merit.44 The property nature of tort claims plays
into this dynamic as well. The existence of the plaintiff’s property right
in a legal claim is independent of the strength of the claim. And, as
option theory predicts, those claims have economic value as put op-
tions, even if the underlying claim has little merit. If lowering the costs
of filing a claim—and thus acquiring a form of property—leads to the
filing of, and payment for, non-meritorious claims, it will interfere
with achieving optimal deterrence as well.
The individual allocation of property rights in claims can also lead
to horizontal inequities in mass torts. There is a degree of randomness
built into the tort system that can result in radically different out-
39. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Some Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 143–44 (1974).
40. See Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1202–04.
41. See Galanter, supra note 39, at 117; see also Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves”
on Your Side, supra note 17, at 99.
42. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions, supra note 38.
43. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989).
44. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, MDL Practices and the Need for FRCP Amend-
ments: Proposals for Discussion with the MDL/TPLF Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules 1–2 (Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.lfcj.com/uploads/1/1/2/0/112061-707/lcj_memo_-_
mdl__tplf_proposals_for_discussion_9-14-18__004_.pdf. The extent of this problem in the real
world, however, is much less clear.
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comes for seemingly similarly situated plaintiffs. Imagine two identical
twin plaintiffs who both took the same defective drug, marketed na-
tionwide by the same manufacturer, and both developed the same
cancer five years later. However, one lives in state A with a six-year
statute of limitations for torts and the other lives in state B where the
statute of limitations is four years. Because their claims are allocated
individually, one may recover while the other will get nothing. Or sup-
pose that the drug in question tripled the chance of developing lung
cancer in everyone who took it, but one twin was exposed to a sub-
stance at work that also causes lung cancer. The twin exposed at work
may be unable to prove specific causation because he cannot rule out
the workplace carcinogen as a cause, even though he was exposed to
the same level of risk by taking the drug as his brother.45
When rights are distributed at the individual level, differences in
factors like choice of law, the ability to prove specific causation, and
even the inherent degree of randomness in jury verdicts may lead to
different outcomes for seemingly similarly situated plaintiffs. These
sorts of differences among potential plaintiffs do not matter from the
defendant’s perspective; the defendant deals in aggregate risks. The
different outcomes might seem arbitrary from the plaintiffs’ perspec-
tive, even if they are rooted in state sovereignty or long-standing tort
theory. And some differences, like the unpredictable decisions of in-
sufficiently instructed lay jurors, may be truly arbitrary.46
The individual allocation of property rights in tort claims reflects
the essentially binary nature of tort law. Tort law deals in discrete acci-
dents, determining liability in an on or off fashion for each occurrence,
not in probabilities or averages.47 Defendants generally are not liable
for the increased risks they impose on plaintiffs unless and until those
risks are realized. And the compensatory damages awarded to make
injured plaintiffs whole are not discounted to reflect ex ante risk.
This binary approach can lead to inequities and inefficiencies in
mass torts. The consequences are stark when it comes to specific cau-
sation. A defendant may engage in conduct, such as emitting a toxic
substance or manufacturing a defective drug, that is statistically cer-
tain to cause cancer to an ascertainable percentage of the exposed
45. For elaboration on the use of relative risk in proving specific causation in toxic tort cases,
see Joseph Sanders et al., Differential Etiology: Inferring Individual Causation in the Law from
Group Data in Science (Mar. 18, 2019) (draft) (on file with author).
46. See, e.g., Joseph Sanders, Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER
WMS. U. L. REV. 115, 123–28 (2008).
47. See Lee Anne Fennell, Accidents and Aggregates, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2371, 2379
(2018).
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population, say forty percent.48 But no individual plaintiff may be ca-
pable of proving that it was more likely than not that exposure to the
defendant’s tortious conduct caused her particular cancer.49 Thus, no
plaintiff can recover, and the defendant will not be found liable for
any of the harm that it has caused. Conversely, if the defendant’s con-
duct could be shown statistically to cause injury sixty percent of the
time, the defendant could be charged with liability for every plaintiff’s
harm, notwithstanding the fact that it was not to blame in forty per-
cent of the cases. Neither situation is desirable from the standpoint of
optimal deterrence or horizontal equity.50
These sorts of anomalies occur because tort claims—even in mass
harm cases—are allocated at the individual level, and not the group
level. Tort law is primarily concerned with whether a particular defen-
dant caused a particular plaintiff’s injury, not with the levels of risk
that defendants impose on populations. It doesn’t have to be this way.
Tort law could, for example, recognize a cause of action for increased
risk and allocate the claim to the class of exposed persons as a form of
common property. Indeed, some states recognize claims for medical
monitoring along these lines.51 But, for the most part, tort law has
stuck to its binary and individualistic roots, even in mass torts.
As a result, even if enforcement were costless, the individualized
allocation of property rights in claims can frustrate tort law’s instru-
mental goals in mass torts. Under-deterrence is not only a result of
litigation costs. If we know that the defendant’s conduct causes harm
to an identifiable number of people, but we do not impose liability
because we cannot figure out which ones, the defendant will not inter-
nalize the costs of the harms it causes.52 The binary nature of tort law
combined with the individual allocation of property rights in claims
can cause deviations from optimal deterrence (in either direction),
even if litigation were costless.
B. Preventing Plaintiffs From Maximizing Claim Value
In addition to frustrating some of the instrumental goals of tort law,
the individual allocation of property rights in tort claims can also pre-
vent individual plaintiffs from maximizing the value of their claims. In
48. See id. at 2423–25.
49. Id.
50. Id. As Fennell notes, this is essentially an operation the famous gatecrasher paradox,
which illustrates the systematic skew that can result from the more-likely-than-not standard
when it is played out over a large number of cases. See id. at 2425–27 (citing L. JONATHAN
COHEN, THE PROBABLE AND THE PROVABLE 75 (1977)).
51. See, e.g., Redland Soccer Club v. Dept. of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 142 (Pa. 1997).
52. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 47, at 2425.
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order to litigate effectively against the defendant in a mass tort—and
to negotiate the best price for the sale of their claims—plaintiffs need
to work together. But plaintiffs face a collective action problem if
each plaintiff is the sole decider about what happens with her claim.
Aggregation itself can be costly. Most of the time, mass tort victims
will have no preexisting relationship, will be spread out all over the
country, and probably will not even be aware of each other’s exis-
tence. Unless a class action is feasible (which is unlikely in most mass
torts), lawyers will have to invest in identifying and aggregating claims
informally, which may require expensive advertising and webs of re-
ferral arrangements.53 Additionally, because of the one-way nature of
nonmutual issue preclusion, the dominant strategy for many plaintiffs
will be to sit on the sidelines and wait to see how other plaintiffs fare
before filing their own suits.54 If other plaintiffs prevail, these wait-
and-see plaintiffs can free ride on the preclusive effect of their victory
on any common issues; if the early plaintiffs lose, the later ones are
not bound and can learn from their mistakes. Either way, later plain-
tiffs can take advantage of information uncovered in the earlier plain-
tiffs’ case development and discovery.55
Beyond the transaction costs of aggregation, the allocation of con-
trol rights at the individual level creates additional problems. Defend-
ants in mass tort litigation value peace and will often pay a premium
to put the entire litigation behind them.56 Indeed, defendants often
insist on near universal participation as a condition of settling mass
tort claims and reserve the right to walk away from a global settle-
ment if more than a handful of plaintiffs refuse to sign on.57 The plain-
tiffs therefore stand to gain if they can bundle together all of their
claims for sale to the defendant in a single transaction. But because
each plaintiff has a property right in his or her individual claim, an
53. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation
After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1928 (2002); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the
Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 534–39; Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A Peterson, Understanding Mass
Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1024 (1993).
54. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).
55. This prospect of one-way preclusion was a major impetus for the adoption of the modern
class action rule in 1966. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 547 (1974) (“The
1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically . . . to assure that members of the class
would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by all subsequent orders and
judgments.”).
56. See Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1193.
57. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Closure Provisions in MDL Settlements, 85 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2175, 2179 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, The Trouble with All-or-Nothing Settlements, 58
KAN. L. REV. 979, 981 (2010).
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anticommons dynamic arises.58 Too many owners can veto a value-
generating assembly transaction.59 Each plaintiff becomes a potential
holdout who can blow up the global deal, and the mere threat of po-
tential holdouts can lead the defendant to withhold the peace pre-
mium and prevent the plaintiffs from maximizing the value of their
claims.60
Finally, the allocation of property rights in claims at the individual
plaintiff level instead of the group level handicaps the repeat-player
lawyers who emerge and aggregate claims on the plaintiffs’ side of a
mass tort. Because each single-shot plaintiff is the decider for his or
her claim, the lawyers are not free to make the kinds of tradeoffs
across an inventory of claims that repeat-player defendants make all
the time.61 Even a savvy repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyer will have diffi-
culty playing for rules if she cannot dismiss a relatively weak claim
because the individual plaintiff wants her day in court. The same oc-
curs if she cannot take a strong claim to trial because that plaintiff
needs the cash and is unwilling to roll the dice at trial when a middling
settlement offer is on the table. A mass tort defendant can play the
odds and shape the development of the rules of the game in its favor
by making these sorts of tradeoffs. But individual plaintiffs’ ownership
of their claims prevents repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyers from playing
that game as effectively, weakening the hand of all of the plaintiffs vis-
a`-vis the defendant.62
III. THE PROPERTY NATURE OF CLAIMS FRUSTRATES PUBLIC
ORDERING AND ENABLES PRIVATE ORDERING
When property rights are allocated on the wrong scale and there are
gains to be had by assembling them, pressure to bundle the rights to-
gether will inevitably emerge.63 Indeed, in the mass tort context, there
have been many calls to shift to a system that recognizes the mass
nature of the harm, focuses more on instrumental goals, and adopts a
more explicitly probabilistic approach based on averages and risk in-
stead of tort law’s current binary approach to questions like causa-
tion.64 In other words, to shift to a more administrative model. The
58. Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1198–1201.
59. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 668–69 (1998).
60. See Samuel Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 417 (2014).
61. See Galanter, supra note 39, at 117.
62. See Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side, supra note 17, at 98–101.
63. See Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1207.
64. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Actions, supra note 38.
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treatment of tort claims as property rights, however, simultaneously
impedes efforts the state might make to shift towards public adminis-
tration while facilitating a shift towards private administration
through private ordering and settlement.
A. Property Rights Impede Public Ordering
The treatment of tort claims as property rights can be an obstacle to
government efforts to more fully achieve some of the instrumental
goals of tort law. Take the simplest example: Suppose that in the wake
of a mass tort, the legislature wishes to displace the tort system en-
tirely with a regularized public administrative system for handing out
compensation that it believes will be more efficient and fair—some-
thing along the lines of a workers’ compensation system, but applied
retroactively. Some have argued that such a retroactive elimination of
plaintiffs’ vested property rights in their claims could open the govern-
ment up to a due process or takings challenge.65 Whether or not such
challenges would be successful under modern doctrine, the intuitive
attachment that people have for their legal claims may make such a
move politically unpalatable. Thus, there may be limits to how far the
legislature can go in retroactively imposing a public administrative
system. And the handful of attempts that Congress has made, such as
the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the 9/11 Victims Compensa-
tion Fund, gave plaintiffs the choice of opting into the administrative
scheme or keeping their pre-existing tort claims.66 Prospective shifts
towards administrative schemes like workers compensation, by con-
trast, do not implicate the same concerns about depriving anyone of
vested property rights. But it is often hard to manage mass torts pro-
spectively because the government does not know when or where they
will occur.
The property nature of tort claims also limits how far the judicial
system can go towards adopting an administrative model for mass tort
claims, even if such a model would better serve tort law’s instrumental
65. See, e.g., Ettor v. City of Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148, 155 (1913); Richmond Screw Anchor Co.
v. United States, 271 U.S. 331, 333 (1928); Blumenthal, supra note 2, at 403; Erin G. Holt, The
September 11 Victims Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
OF AM. L. 513, 540–41 (2004); Radin, supra note 2, at 1331–33.
66. See Robert L. Rabin, Reflections on Tort and the Administrative State, 61 DEPAUL L. REV.
239, 254 (2012); Holt, supra note 65, at 526. The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabiliza-
tion Act of 2001 (ATSSSA), which created the 9/11 Fund, did alter the plaintiffs pre-existing tort
rights by limiting the plaintiffs’ venue choice to one federal district court and capping the air-
lines’ liability at their insurance limits. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 408(a), (b)(3). And the ATSSSA has been
criticized for retroactively altering the plaintiffs’ vested rights in this manner. Holt, supra note
65, at 540–41.
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\69-2\DPL207.txt unknown Seq: 16 21-APR-20 12:08
602 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:587
goals. Ever since Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts, where the Supreme
Court recognized that class members’ choses in action are constitu-
tionally protected property rights, the Due Process Clause has limited
how far the class action can go toward treating plaintiffs in the aggre-
gate.67 Outside of the limited-fund scenario, plaintiffs with damages
claims cannot be forced to litigate together in a mandatory class ac-
tion, even if that is the best way to achieve optimal deterrence.68 Nor
can they be forced to accept a settlement that sets up an alternative
administrative scheme—even one approved and supervised by the
court—to hand out compensation in a more streamlined, efficient, and
consistent manner.69 Due process guarantees class members an oppor-
tunity to opt out of the class action, thereby preserving each individual
plaintiff’s role as the decider for what will happen to her claim.70
Similarly, the property conception of tort claims and the due pro-
cess constraints that go along with it have tripped up efforts to use
even opt-out class actions to resolve mass torts. Since Amchem Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. Windsor, the prevailing wisdom has been that mass torts
usually involve too many individual issues to be appropriate for class
certification.71 Choice-of-law problems alone can be enough to doom
class certification.72 These concerns about predominance, class cohe-
sion, and intraclass structural conflicts of interest find their root in,
and get their due process flavor from, the allocation of property rights
in claims at the individual plaintiff level. Class action doctrine, for the
most part, does not view mass tort claims as belonging to the class as
an undifferentiated entity, but rather as belonging to the individual
plaintiffs.73 As a result, aggregation of mass tort claims occurs largely
67. 472 U.S. 797, 814 (1985).
68. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 361–62 n.1, 363 (2011); Oritz v. Fibreboard
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999).
69. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring court to review settlement for fairness). Cf. D. Theo-
dore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L. 91 (2014) (arguing that
class action settlements are a form of ADR).
70. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812. For federal class actions, Rule 23(b)(3) also guarantees
the right to opt out. But that guarantee is motivated by the same due process concerns expressed
in Shutts. See Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
SUP. CT. REV. 337, 367, 369 (1999).
71. 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also David Marcus, Erie, The Class Action Fairness Act, and Some
Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1281 (2007).
72. See, e.g., Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009).
73. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 913 (1998) (discussing entity and aggregation models of class actions).
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in systems like federal MDL, which—at least formally—preserves the
individual nature of each claim.74
Similarly, this insistence on individual property rights in claims has
frustrated efforts to use techniques like statistical adjudication or
binding bellwether trials to increase efficiency and consistency in mass
tort cases.75 Courts have eschewed these techniques, even where ex-
trapolation from a sample of cases may be cheaper, more accurate,
more consistent, and get closer to optimal deterrence than individual
treatment.76 Because the property rights in claims are allocated at the
individual level instead of the group level, courts cannot simply dis-
pose with individualized inquiries into elements like causation.77
In short, the property rights that individual plaintiffs hold in their
tort claims can impede public efforts to use formal mechanisms, like
regulation, class actions, or statistical adjudication to aggregate claims
and achieve some of the instrumental goals of tort law in the mass tort
context.
B. Property Rights Enable Private Ordering
While the property characteristics of tort claims may frustrate pub-
lic efforts to shift towards administrative treatment of mass torts,
those very same features facilitate private ordering. Because property
rights in mass tort claims are allocated at the wrong scale not only to
achieve some of tort law’s instrumental goals but also to maximize
their value, there are potentially massive gains to be captured by those
who can successfully bundle them together.78 It is thus no surprise that
entrepreneurial lawyers and other intermediaries emerge as would-be
bundlers in mass torts. Indeed, Samuel Issacharoff and John Fabian
Witt described this push toward aggregate settlements of claims as
“inevitable.”79 More recently, Nathaniel Donahue and Witt explained
74. See Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information Forcing Role of the Judge in
Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1269–73 (2017) [hereinafter Bradt & Rave,
Information Forcing] (explaining how MDL’s formal respect for the individual nature of each
case enables aggregation of mass tort claims where the class action would not).
75. See Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2323 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 (2008).
76. See, e.g., Jay Tidmarsh, Resurrecting Trial By Statistics, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1459, 1465–69
(2015).
77. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013); Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 313 (5th Cir. 1998); Tidmarsh, supra note 76, at 1471–75. Cf. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (disapproving of the “novel project” of “Trial by
Formula”).
78. Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1192, 1207.
79. Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlements: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1569, 1634 (2004).
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how entire systems of private administration have emerged for the
aggregate processing of claims in the shadow of formal tort law.80
Donahue and Witt catalogue several features of substantive tort law
that enable and shape private administration.81 But procedure and the
property-like features of tort claims matter too.
Three features of mass tort claims enable private ordering and form
the foundation of private administration: litigation costs, individual
control, and alienability. As I explained above, a plaintiff’s tort claim
is a form of put option to force the defendant to buy the claim at a
court-determined price.82 The cost of litigation, however, means that
exercising that put option by litigating the claim to judgment will not
usually be the highest value use of the claim. The highest value use
will often be to sell the claim to the defendant through settlement; or,
more realistically, to engage a lawyer who handles a large volume of
similar claims on a contingency fee basis to negotiate the sale of the
claim to the defendant. The plaintiff’s control over, and ability to
alienate, her property right in the claim are essential to this transac-
tion. And a more fulsome embrace of tort claims as property rights
opens up the potential for additional avenues of buying and selling
ownership stakes in the claims, such as new forms of third-party litiga-
tion financing.
Once we see settlement as a property sale, valuation becomes the
name of the game. The parties need to figure out how much each
plaintiff’s put option is worth. And any savings in the process of valua-
tion goes to the parties to the transaction. Valuation of claims through
individual trials is very expensive. So, as Donahue and Witt describe
(and students of mass torts have long known) repeat-player lawyers
collect large inventories of claims and then work together with repeat
players on the defense side to simplify the process of valuation.83 They
construct grids based on a handful of salient factors (age, timing of
exposure, type of injury, etc.) and assign average awards to different
categories.84 These assignments are based on probabilistic assessments
instead of looking at each claim individually and asking binary ques-
tions like whether it is more likely than not that the exposure to the
defendant’s product caused this particular plaintiff’s injury.85
80. See Donahue & Witt, supra note 15.
81. Id.
82. See supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
83. Donahue & Witt, supra note 15, at 7, 16.
84. Id.
85. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT (2007).
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In other words, the process of aggregating and settling claims—a
process that is possible precisely because the claims are private prop-
erty—smooths out some of the more individualistic features of tort
law. Simple proxies like timing of exposure and injury are substituted
for specific causation inquiries. Fine-grained differences based on
things like choice of law rarely make it into settlement grids.86 Recov-
eries are compressed and smoothed out.87
Of course, the parties who design and participate in these settle-
ments do it for the private savings, not to achieve optimal deterrence
or horizontal equity. Indeed, accepting approximation in valuation in
exchange for aggregation is a common strategy for owners of property
rights that are allocated at the wrong scale for their most efficient
use.88 Musicians, for example, often join copyright collectives that sell
blanket licenses to media outlets to play any song in the collection.89
Royalties are then distributed to members according to predeter-
mined pricing grids or other methods of approximate valuation, which
generates a substantial transaction-cost savings over negotiating the
price of song licenses individually.90 Similarly, owners of tort claims
are willing to trade accuracy in claims valuation for efficiency, not out
of any desire to further some instrumental goal like deterrence, but
because it yields savings in litigation costs and allows them to avoid
the risk of losing on an all-or-nothing question, like causation.
But this sort of private ordering, made possible by the potential for
private gain, has the fortuitous result of furthering some of tort law’s
instrumental goals. A shift towards private administration can in-
crease horizontal equity in many respects. It eliminates some of the
randomness built into the tort and litigation systems. And it focuses
on the handful of differences among plaintiffs that the settlement de-
signers think are most relevant rather than distinctions that might
strike some as arbitrary, such as which plaintiffs had a preexisting
medical condition that made it impossible to prove specific causation
through the only available epidemiological evidence.91 Indeed, this
sort of private administration might even increase deterrence in some
scenarios. Aggregation of claims into the hands of repeat players, who
86. Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1307–08 & n.295
(2018).
87. See Donahue & Witt, supra note 15, at 51–52.
88. Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1229–38.
89. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
90. Id. at 1319, 1329; see also Rave, Anticommons, supra note 34, at 1230–31.
91. See, e.g., Sanders et al., supra note 45.
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then adopt lower-cost methods of approximating their value, may in-
crease the rate of claiming. In turn, this forces the defendant to inter-
nalize the costs of harms done to plaintiffs whose claims could not
profitably be litigated on an individual basis. It may also increase de-
terrence if it allows for at least some recovery in cases where the evi-
dence shows that the defendant’s conduct causes harm to some known
number of people—but cannot identify the specific people—so that
no particular plaintiffs could prove the specific causation necessary to
recover at trial.
C. Consequences
Property rights in tort claims are a precondition to private ordering
and developing a private market for claims. These same property-right
protections have made it difficult for the government to use formal
mechanisms to pursue some of tort law’s instrumental goals by creat-
ing systems of public administration. In turn, the lack of competing
public systems of administration channels more claims into the private
sphere.92 It is perhaps ironic that these property-right protections—
rooted in civil recourse or corrective justice theories of tort law—have
enabled the emergence of private forms of administration that rely on
the same sorts of aggregate treatment of claims that civil recourse the-
orists find so objectionable in public models. This channeling of mass
tort claims out of the public and into the private sphere has upsides
and downsides. The property-right nature of tort claims continues to
shape, and in some ways limit, what private administration can do.
One advantage of the private administration that property rights
facilitates is flexibility. As Donahue and Witt explain, “Private settle-
ment matrixes constructed in the shadow of the law are more dynamic
and responsive to changing times than the most prominent schedules
constructed by statue[,]” like workers compensation.93 Unlike their
public counterparts, systems built on private ordering can more easily
incorporate new information—such as new epidemiological studies or
jury verdicts—and evolve in response to such information.
Forcing this sort of private ordering to occur outside of formal pub-
lic processes, however, comes at the cost of transparency and consis-
tency. The individual property protections of tort claims that make
mass tort class actions impracticable do not block either aggregation
or aggregate settlements. But they do remove those settlements from
92. Cf. Donahue & Witt, supra note 15, at 20 (“[P]rivate administration in tort will typically
emerge when the government has not created a public regime to rationalize the common law
claims process.”).
93. Id. at 36.
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scrutiny and supervision in the public courts. As Judge Anthony J.
Scirica explained in Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., “[O]utside the
federal rules governing class actions, there is no prescribed indepen-
dent review of the structural and substantive fairness of a settlement
including evaluation of attorneys’ fees, potential conflicts of interest,
and counsel’s allocation of settlement funds among class members.”94
Many of the aggregate settlement and private claim administration
processes that emerge operate in the dark shadows of the law, inde-
pendent of any judicial oversight and shielded from public scrutiny by
confidentiality agreements.95 There may be some opportunities to in-
still a modicum of transparency and consistency back into the process.
For example, where mass tort claims are consolidated in federal
MDLs, the MDL judge can and should review, and offer a nonbinding
opinion on, the fairness of even non-class global settlements.96 But
these opportunities are limited; not all cases proceed under the aus-
pices of an MDL, not all MDLs are resolved through global settle-
ments that are easily amenable to review, and even those that are
depend to some degree on cooperation by the lawyers.
Another advantage of this sort of private ordering in mass torts is
that it allows powerful repeat players to emerge on the plaintiffs’ side
who can serve as counterweights to the repeat players that exist on the
defense side.97 Because these repeat players have a financial stake in
the litigation and settlement system, they have strong incentives to
work to prevent the playing field from tilting too far in the defend-
ants’ favor.
In some ways, the private systems that have emerged allow these
repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyers to play more effectively than they
could in public systems like class action litigation. One of the biggest
advantages that repeat-player defendants have over one-shotter plain-
tiffs—even those represented by repeat-player lawyers—is the ability
to make tradeoffs across cases. Defendants can, for example, play for
rules by overpaying to settle cases they are likely to lose in order to
avoid making bad precedent that will hurt them over a whole series of
cases.98 A repeat-player plaintiffs’ lawyer is not supposed to make
those kinds of tradeoffs across his one-shotter clients’ claims.99 And
under the watchful eye of a class action judge (and other lawyers who
94. 667 F.3d 273, 334 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
95. See Donahue & Witt, supra note 15, at 54.
96. Bradt & Rave, Information Forcing, supra note 74, at 1264–65.
97. See Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side, supra note 17.
98. Galanter, supra note 39, at 100–03.
99. Id. at 117.
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would be happy to earn a fee by representing objectors), lawyers for
the class often cannot make the kinds of tradeoffs that would allow
them to play the odds and play for rules as effectively as the defen-
dant. But outside of the formal system, with only the legal ethics rules
and amorphous threats of ex post malpractice liability to constrain
them, these rules against making tradeoffs may not fully penetrate at
the ground level, and plaintiffs’ lawyers may find the flexibility they
need to play for rules and play the odds more effectively.100 They
might voluntarily dismiss weak claims before trial to avoid a loss that
would decrease the settlement value of other cases or agree to an ag-
gregate settlement that requires them to recommend the deal to their
entire inventory of clients to maximize the value of the claims for
the group, even though some individual plaintiffs might be short-
changed.101
Of course, empowering repeat players in this manner exacerbates
the principal-agent problem inherent in mass litigation and leaves
one-shotter plaintiffs vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of their
repeat-player lawyers.102 Without the judicial supervision of a class ac-
tion or other forms of regulatory oversight, the repeat players on both
sides can shape the system of private administration of tort claims to
their own advantages.103 This is not to say that the repeat players will
inevitably collude with each other at the expense of the one-shotters;
they will remain antagonists in many forums. But they do not design
settlements in the public interest or to achieve the instrumental goals
of tort law, like deterrence and horizontal equity. They design systems
of private administration to benefit themselves. And any progress on
instrumental goals is a byproduct that may come with a considerable
amount of rent-seeking.
Private property rights in tort claims impose important limits on
what private ordering can do. Any system of aggregate settlement or
private administration ultimately depends on obtaining buy-in from
individual plaintiffs—the ones who own the claims.104 Each individual
plaintiff’s role as the decider on the fate of her claim is guaranteed by
the property rights she holds in her claim. The market for tort claims
cannot override individual plaintiffs’ consent. But there are limits on
how much that individual control can accomplish in an environment
100. See Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side, supra note 17, at 105–09.
101. See id. at 106–08.
102. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV.
67 (2017).
103. See Donahue & Witt, supra note 15, at 50.
104. See Bradt & Rave, It’s Good to Have the “Haves” on Your Side, supra note 17, at 109–10.
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shaped by the repeat players that operate in this market with little in
the way of transparency or formal public oversight. The structure of
private administration that emerges from this private market can
shape the plaintiffs’ options for how they can use their property rights
as a practical matter. While this may often lead to increases in effi-
ciency and horizontal equity, as plaintiffs trade the cost and risk of
litigating their individual claims to judgment for a quicker and
cheaper private processing and sale of their property rights en masse,
it is far from perfect.
CONCLUSION
Because tort claims are property rights, the plaintiff’s role as the
decider, which is rooted in civil recourse and corrective justice theory,
is constitutionally protected. And attempts in mass torts to move off
the individualistic baseline through formal public mechanisms of ag-
gregation run into problems. The irony is that the very same commit-
ment to individual property rights in tort claims facilitates the
aggregate resolution of mass torts through private ordering in settle-
ments that rely on the very methods of approximation and averaging
that corrective justice and civil recourse theory eschew. While private
aggregation and settlement may further some of the instrumental
goals of tort law, they operate without the transparency and oversight
that come with public models.
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